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Abstract 
In this paper I empirically test what variables directly affect firm leverage across 
European countries, considering institutional, economic and macroeconomic variables. I 
find evidence in favour of the trade-off theory, given by the positive relation between 
profitability and leverage, and also evidence in favour of the pecking-order theory, 
given by the negative relation between tax rate and leverage. Thus, at the country-level, 
capital structure choices are partially explained by the trade-off theory and the pecking-
order theory. In addition, I find that institutional and macroeconomic factors, such as 
entry into the EMU and economic crisis, greatly impact firm leverage across European 
Countries.  
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1- Introduction: 
The availability of finance can be influenced by various factors, such as the size of the 
firm, the sector it operates in, and the institutional settings of its operating country. 
Furthermore, the macroeconomic conditions in the country can also play a role in 
affecting firms’ financial decisions. This paper aims at identifying the determinants of 
variation in firm leverage across European countries. I empirically examine a set of data 
directly taken from the European Central Bank site, with country-level closing-balance 
sheet annual data from 1999 to 2010.  
My main findings are:  
Firm leverage is highly correlated with the occurrence of the crisis in 2008. This 
positive relation may be reasonably linked with the decrease in assets, thus in equity, 
with the occurrence of the crisis. In addition, the European Monetary Union entry is 
have a positive impact on firm leverage; however, the EU entry does not appear to be 
associated with firms’ capital structures. These findings indicate that, while the 
membership of the EU does not necessarily help improving funding conditions of firms, 
joining the EMU does indeed facilitate firms’ access to debt funding.   
There is high level of positive correlation between the efficiency of the judicial system 
and firms’ leverage ratio. The finding is aligned with what La Porta (1999) found, 
proving that countries with higher legal protection reflect a higher leverage ratio.  
What turned out to be weakly affecting the leverage ratio is the corporate tax rate. In 
fact, it shows a negative relation with the dependent variable, with a very low level of 
statistical significance, against the trade–off theory. I find a high positive significance of 
the non-financial corporations’ investment rates and profitability ratios. These results 
strongly support the trade-off theory, demonstrating that more profitable firms are more 
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likely to borrow money, resulting in greater chances to invest in growing opportunities. 
Furthermore, macroeconomic evidence results from the negative relation between the 
GDP per capita and the leverage ratio, expressing the necessity, on average, of 
borrowing less money as countries’ welfares increase.  
Lastly, I find that the leverage ratio of non-financial corporations appears to be highly 
affected by monetary and financial institutions’ (MFI) loans granted by non-MFI euro 
area residents, including the general government and the private sector, and by non-MFI 
holdings of securities, such as shares, other equity and debt securities, issued by MFI in 
the euro area. 
Section 2 includes a review of the literature on the two traditional views of capital 
structure: the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory. Section 3 will present and 
explain the dataset used. Section 4 and 5 will analyse the results obtained by running a 
regression on the data chosen. Finally, the last section concludes the work. 
 
2- Literature Review: 
This study is related to the firms’ leverage ratio analysis between European countries. 
Two strands of literature are relevant for this study. The first refers to corporate finance, 
including the two classic theories, which are the trade-off model and the pecking-order 
model. The second strand is related to empirical corporate finance studies made at the 
country-level.  
Trade-off theory is proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958). They first presented their 
work stating that under very binding assumptions, like the absence of taxes, it is 
irrelevant how firms build their capital structures. A few years later, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) presented the trade-off model, which focuses on firms looking for a target 
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leverage that optimally combines the various costs of debt, like financial distress costs, 
and the benefits of debt, like tax savings. Thus, this theory leads to the pursuit of an 
optimum level of leverage by balancing and quantifying the corporate tax savings of 
debt with those costs linked to bankruptcy. The first critiques to the model arose by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), and Hart and Moore (1994), noting that 
agency conflicts that may occur between shareholders and managers might be favouring 
perks and power at the expense of shareholders. Myers (1977) also discussed agency 
conflicts, considering them disputes between debt-holders and shareholders, and linking 
them to firms with high growth opportunities, thus less debt. However, the trade-off 
theory was integrated some years later by the study made by Miller (1977), who showed 
that bankruptcy costs seemed to have a minor impact on the leverage ratio, rather than 
the tax savings. In the following years, further studies conducted by De Angelo and 
Masulis (1980) and by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), found an alignment with the 
trade-off theory, quantifying the effects and showing how large they could be under 
reasonable conditions. Myers (1984) made some critiques to the model, proving that the 
tax effect occurs in a lesser way than the bankruptcy costs, thus going against the 
abovementioned Miller (1977) study. Agency costs, and their negative correlation with 
leverage, are also discussed by Diamond (1989), and by Harris and Raviv (1990), 
confirming that firms with a long trend of credits are linked to low default probability. 
Thus, profitability of firms is one of the most relevant factors affecting leverage. In fact, 
as profitability increases, bankruptcy costs decrease, allowing firms to borrow more, as 
stated by Graham (2000). More profitable firms face higher expected tax rates, leading 
firms to engage in higher leverage to benefit more from the tax shield, as stated by De 
Angelo and Masulis (1980). Furthermore, profitability tends to be linked directly to 
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higher cash flows, in order to have more excess earnings over profitable investments, 
reported again by Graham (2000). Studies conducted by Barclay and Smith (1999), as 
well as Green and Hollifield (2003), also found coherence and an alignment with the 
trade-off theory, proving and quantifying the effects displayed by the model under 
reasonable conditions. The trade-off theory was also criticised by Ju, Parrino, 
Poteshman and Weisbach (2003), who simulated a tax bankruptcy trade-off model to 
quantify and prove the too small bankruptcy costs’ effect asserted by Miller (1977), 
without finding any results in favour. In the end, according to the theory, firms with 
more tangible assets tend to have lower bankruptcy costs, since tangible assets may be 
considered as collaterals, as stated by Graham (2011). 
The second of the two main theories concerning corporate capital structure’s decisions 
is the pecking-order theory. Myers and Majluf (1984), discuss how firms’ decisions 
follow a financing hierarchy aimed at minimizing adverse selection costs of security 
issuance. The pecking-order view highlights that the adverse selection costs of issuing 
equity are so high to let other costs and benefits of debt and equity second-order. 
Stiglitz (1973), Heaton (2002), and Myers (2003) discuss in favour of the pecking-order 
theory, stating that frictions such as transaction costs, taxes, agency costs and 
managerial optimism lead to a financing hierarchy. Thus, mature firms with limited 
growth prospects first use retained earnings, then debt, and finally issue equity only as a 
last opportunity. Myers and Majluf (1984) justified this hierarchy by two empirical 
regularities. There is a substantial negative market reaction to the announcement of 
equity issues, and, firms contribute to the majority of investments with retained 
earnings, while aggregate net equity issues are often small.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
demonstrate that more profitable firms are linked to a lower leverage. On the other 
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hand, larger firms may have more assets available, so adverse selection would damage 
them. At the same time, as Fama and French (2002) state, larger firms suffer less 
asymmetric information, so the adverse selection damage would be minor. Several 
studies went against the pecking-order theory’s assumptions, like Helwege and Liang 
(1996) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who showed a strong correlation between 
a firm’s “financing deficit” (a proxy for the need for external funding) and the issuance 
of debt. Then, when Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and French (2005) tested the 
results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) on a broader sample, they found that smaller 
and younger firms occupy their financing deficits mostly with equity. After these 
critiques, Lemmon and Zender (2010) stated that these findings should not be 
considered necessarily inconsistent with the pecking-order assumptions, mainly because 
those firms with high growth opportunities might be bound by limited debt capacity, 
even if this would lead to trade-off forces. Furthermore, when Myers and Majluf (1984) 
stated the theorem, they demonstrated that their theory is more likely to become true for 
those firms, whose value of growth opportunities is relatively low in relation to assets in 
place. Leary and Roberts (2010) proved that the pecking order is not so reliable in 
predicting issuance decisions, even among subsamples where the theory is most 
expected to hold. From an empirical study made by Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
from a survey ran by Harris and Raviv (1991), the main factors which affect capital 
structure decisions are summarized: the leverage “increases with fixed assets, non-debt 
tax shields, growth opportunities, and firm size, and decreases with volatility, 
advertising expenditures, R&D expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and 
uniqueness of the product.” 
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While the pecking order may be a useful “conditional theory” (Myers (2001)), like the 
trade-off view, it leaves many financing decisions unexplained.  
Broadening the argument to the second relevant strand of literature, previous studies 
have focused on specific factors. Institutional factors, such as a high ownership 
concentration are often considered relevant for determining leverage. As argued by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the concentration of 
ownership of a firm’s share leads to providing managers incentives to work, and large 
investors to monitor the managers. Implicitly, this situation reflects a country with poor 
investor protection. Furthermore, investors might be better protected if dividend rights 
are directly linked to voting rights, in place of being subjected to the one-share-one vote 
method, as stated by Grossman and Hart (1988) and also by Harris and Raviv (1988). 
Creditors need to be protected as well as shareholders, and as underlined by Hart 
(1995), the most basic right of a creditor is to repossess and then liquidate or keep 
collateral when a loan is in default. Furthermore, there are some unclear situations 
analysed by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and by Wald (1999), in which many 
determinants of leverage have a similar impact in different countries, despite their large 
differences in business environments. First, differences in legal protections of investors 
could help to explain why firms are financed and owned in so different ways from 
country to country, as stated in La Porta (1999). In his study, he showed that countries 
with weak investor protections have much smaller debt and equity markets.  
Justifying and explaining different internal institutional factors and effects as Pagano, 
Panetta and Zingales (1998) did, wondering why Italian companies would rarely go 
public; or as Edwards and Fischer (1994) did, finding why Germany has a small stock 
market but maintaining large and powerful banks at the same time. All these studies 
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witness that since different countries are regulated by different rules, this might explain 
large differences in financing patterns. Other institutional factors, as studied by Knack 
and Keefer (1995), such as proxies for the quality of enforcement, corruption, rule of 
law and efficiency of judicial system, affect the national growth rate and the leverage of 
the companies inside each country. King and Levine (1993), as well as Levine and 
Zervos (1998) found that developed debt and equity markets contribute to economic 
growth; at the same time Rajan and Zingales (1998) found that countries with highly 
developed financial systems show higher growth in capital intensive sectors that rely 
particularly on external finance. At the end of 1999, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
and Chirinko and Singha (2000) examined if the pecking-order theory could be applied 
at the country-level as well, focusing on a US firm’s sample. The first found 
correspondence between the theory and the sample, but the second researchers made a 
parallel study and gave a critical review to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). A few 
years later, Gaud et al. (2007) examined capital structure choices in a large number of 
European countries and found that neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order one 
may adequately fit. Thus, even if there are no direct theories, several studies have been 
made about capital structure, highlighting other relevant components affecting leverage. 
In fact, prior research, such as Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Bancel and 
Mittoo (2004) confirmed what was found by all the previous studies: that costs and 
benefits of leverage depend on the institutional, legal and financial environment. 
 
3- Data: 
I use a dataset collected by the European Central Bank employing the closing balance 
sheet’s data for each country. This dataset provides relevant detailed accounting 
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information about all the countries in Europe
1
. In this work only annual data will be 
used since quarterly data are not available for all the countries. This dataset 
differentiates and separates those countries in the Euro Area from those outside of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), and the sample period is from 1999 until 2010. The 
Euro area accounts provide a comprehensive picture of how economic value is 
generated and distributed in the EMU, on the basis of an analytical grouping of 
economic agents into institutional sectors, namely, households (including non-profit 
institutions serving households), non-financial corporations, financial corporations and 
general government.  
I use country-level data collected for the non-financial corporations, the monetary 
financial institutions, and the households. No inconsistencies arising from the 
aggregation of national data, such “asymmetries”(discrepancies in the recording 
transactions/positions between euro area countries
2
), occur. The following ratios are 
directly taken from the European Central Bank website 
The following data on non-financial corporations are employed
3
: 
The leverage ratio is the ratio (as a percentage) of non-financial corporations’ debt 
outstanding to their total liabilities. This is going to be my dependent variable in the 
research. 
The profit share is the ratio (as a percentage) of non-financial corporations’ gross 
operating surplus and mixed income to their gross value added. This indicator would 
measure non-financial corporations’ profitability. Profits, considered as gross operating 
                                                        
1
 Data for Malta, Bulgaria and Romania are not available, so they are considered in this study. 
2
 E.g. while Germany’s exports of goods to France should be equal to France’s imports of goods from 
Germany, this is not always the case and the difference between the two measures is referred to as 
asymmetries. 
3
 Non-financial corporations and households ratios’ definitions are directly taken from European Central 
Bank website: http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html. 
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surplus, derive from wages costs that remunerate labour, plus net taxes on production 
that partially finance government services. Relying on Antoniou et al. (2007), he shows 
that agency costs increase with free cash flow. Debt may decrease agency costs of free 
cash flow by ensuring an efficient and responsible managers’ behaviour, since this 
would increase bankruptcy costs. Therefore, I expect this ratio to be negatively related 
to my dependent variable. 
The investment rate is the ratio (as a percentage) of non-financial corporations’ gross 
fixed capital formation to their gross value added; it shows the growth of gross value 
added with investment in fixed assets (gross fixed capital formation). As stated by 
Antoniou et al. (2007), larger levels of indebtedness lead firms to engage larger 
investment opportunities. Thus, I expect this ratio to be positively related to the 
leverage. 
The ratio of debt outstanding to GDP is the ratio (as a percentage) of non-financial 
corporations’ debt outstanding to Gross Domestic Product; (where non-financial 
corporations’ debt outstanding intended as the sum of loans taken out, securities issued 
and net equity of households in pension fund reserve liabilities). This ratio should be 
positively related to the leverage, as stated in European Central Bank report (2007). 
When ratios are not presented as a percentage, they are always expressed in Euros, even 
for those countries which are not part of the European Monetary Union. A real 
conversion with the exchange rate considered year per year is computed to express the 
currency, in Euros, of those countries out of the EMU. Thus, having all GDP in Euros, 
it is also possible to have a coherent GDP per capita ratio and a coherent GDP growth 
rate, to understand how much they affect the leverage ratio. Considering that all these 
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factors are referred to a country’s welfare, I expect to find a negative correlation 
between them and the leverage ratio. 
Other relevant numbers considered in this study are taken out by the institutional 
sectors, more specifically the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs). Monetary 
Financial Institutions, which are a part of the Financial Corporations inside each 
country, are those financial institutions that form the money-issuing sector. Thus, these 
encompass the Eurosystem, the resident credit institutions and all other resident 
financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for 
deposits from entities other than MFIs and, their own account to grant credit and/or to 
invest in securities. An MFI credit to euro area residents is comprised of both MFI loans 
granted to non-MFI euro area residents (including the general government and the 
private sector) as well as MFI holdings of securities (shares other equity and debt 
securities) issued by non-MFI euro area residents. The research is going to go through 
the amount of loans taken in and given out to other countries in order to consider the 
Debit and the Credit of each country as a percentage of each Gross Domestic Product. 
As highlighted in the European Central Bank report (2007), the importance of bank 
loans for corporate financing is aligned with their respective level of indebtedness, 
meaning there should be a positive relation. The cost of bank financing is not directly 
linked to the maturity of the loans, implying that the rates are not always higher for 
longer maturities. Furthermore, as Rajan and Zingales (1998) stated, countries with 
financial systems are directly linked to higher country growths, thus to higher leverage.  
The following household data are used: 
The saving rate, which is the ratio (as a percentage) of households’ gross saving to their 
gross disposable income adjusted (adjustment for the change in net equity of households 
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in pension fund reserves). Net saving rates are measured after deducting consumption of 
fixed capital (depreciation). Households’ saving is defined as the difference between its 
disposable income (wages received, revenue of the self–employed and net property 
income) and its consumption (expenditures on goods and services). If there is a negative 
value for the rate, it means that a household spends more than it receives as income, 
thus finances some of the expenditure through credit, through gains deriving from assets 
sale or by running down cash and deposits. As stated in European Central Bank report 
(2007), a larger proportion of household savings should be positively related to non-
financial corporations’ leverage.  
The investment rate is considered as the ratio (as a percentage) of households’ gross 
fixed capital formation to their gross disposable income adjusted (adjustment for the 
change in net equity of households in pension fund reserves); the household investment 
rate mainly consists of the purchase and renovation of dwellings. The increasing 
importance of the investment of households in pension funds and in insurance contracts 
leads, as European Central Bank report (2007) finds, to the decline of investment in 
currency and deposits, and is broadly in line with the increase in corporate market 
financing. Thus, the increase in their relevance tends to lead enterprises to find newer 
modes of financing, thus preferring to purchase instruments issued on the market to 
traditional bank intermediation. Two Dummy variables are also considered to see how 
much they affect the Leverage of each country. They are respectively the entry into the 
European Union and the entry into the European Monetary Union. These two variables 
could produce some relevant results regarding leverage, showing the effect of the euro 
on the European economies. It is very likely that the participation in the EU and the 
EMU has affected leverage in a positive way, since the aggregation of countries under 
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the same currency and the same area eliminated trade barriers and facilitated the 
conditions for debt funding. 
In addition, two factors representing the legal system and the investors’ rights in each 
country will be taken into account. A strong system of legal enforcement could be 
substituted for weak rules since active and well-functioning courts can step in and 
rescue investors abused by management (La Porta, 1999). To address these issues, 
proxies for the quality of enforcement of these rights of “law and order” in different 
countries, compiled by private credit risk agencies for the use of foreign investors 
interested in doing business in the respective countries, are going to be considered. 
Efficiency of the judicial system and rule of law are going to be used in this paper, 
because they pertain to law enforcement proper and they can be considered constant 
over a period of time of 11 years. There are other factors in this category which might 
be affecting the leverage ratio inside a country, such as: Corruption, Risk of 
expropriation and Risk of contract reputation; but these are much more flexible over 
time, so it would be inappropriate to use a constant value for them over a period of time 
of 11 years. Thus, the two institutional factors considered are ranked on a scale from 1 
to 10, where one represents a very unstable internal situation regarding rule of law and 
efficiency of the judicial system, while 10 represents, bureaucratically, the ideal 
situation. As stated by La Porta (1999), these two factors are positively related to 
leverage. That study showed that countries with weak investor protections have much 
smaller debt and equity markets, meaning that the lower the probability of being 
protected, the lower the level of indebtedness for the firms. 
The corporate tax rate used in this research is taken from a survey run by KPMG in 
2009. This survey includes the entire corporate tax rate per country from 1999 to 2009. 
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Since the analysis in this study includes data up to 2010, the corporate tax rate for the 
last year will be assumed to be equal to the previous one for each country. Following 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), the corporate tax rate should be positively linked to the 
leverage ratio since the tax deductibility of interest gives an incentive to firms to 
increase it. Furthermore, macroeconomic variables like GDP per capita, its growth year 
per year, and its Variance computed on a five-year basis, is analyzed. In the end, most 
of these macroeconomic variables are very likely to be positively correlated to the 
leverage ratio, since they are linked to each country’s welfare. As Frank and Goyal 
(2009) stated, there is a high dependence between each firm’s optimal leverage in a 
particular country and the macroeconomic characteristics. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
regarding GDP Growth, found that the rebalancing costs should be lower in good 
countries than in bad countries.  
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics of the variable chosen, and starting from 
the institutional aspects of these variables it is possible to notice that the average of the 
rule of law and the efficiency of judicial system is relatively high. Since countries are 
evaluated on a scale out of 10, an average of 8.5 for the Judicial System and an average 
of 8.7 for the Rule of Law are very elevated values, representing more secure systems 
from a legal point of view. In fact, these indicators arrange countries by legal origin and 
show test of equality of means among families. Scandinavian countries and the United 
Kingdom are at the top of these rankings, immediately followed by Austria. 
Furthermore, the average corporate tax rate adopted all across Europe is 26.68%, which 
is relatively low. The highest tax rate was used by Italy and France in the period right 
before the entry into the Euro, while the lowest values are given by Cyprus, right after 
European Union entry. The leverage variable has an average of 34.64%, and it reflects 
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the situation in almost every country in Europe. Latvia had the highest leverage ratio, 
which was of 100%, exactly the year it entered the European Union (2004)., It then 
began to decrease. The opposite situation occurred in Greece, where in 1999 the 
leverage ratio was of 15.07%, the lowest in Europe. It then started to increase. As 
previously mentioned, the GDP is expressed in Euros for countries both in and out of 
the EMU. Another important indicator is the one represented by the GDP per capita; the 
average across European countries is 21.97, but the maximum value is given by the 
GDP per capita found in Luxembourg, where there is a very high level of production 
compared to the population. The lowest values of these indicators are found in Latvia 
from the end of 1999 on.  
Before starting to write the equation to take into account, and to run the regression to 
spot which variables influence the leverage ratio across European countries, I also 
consider the correlation, through the Pearson indicator, of all the variables with each 
other
4
. I find that the EU entry and the EMU entry have a high significance and that 
they are positively related to the leverage ratio. The rule of law, differently from what 
La Porta (1999) found, has a negative correlation with the dependant variable. The 
efficiency of the judicial system turns out to be positively correlated with the leverage 
ratio, following La Porta’s (1999) finding. The corporate tax rate winds up being 
negatively correlated with the leverage ratio, as stated by Myers and Majluf (1984), but 
it does not show any significance in relation to the leverage ratio. One more variable, 
which turns out to be highly positively correlated with the dependent variable is the 
Debit/GDP, representing the money loaned by other countries. And lastly, the GDP 
                                                        
4
 The correlation table is not included in the study due to limitation of space.  
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growth rate and the GDP standard deviation are both significantly and negatively 
correlated with the leverage indicator. 
 
4- Regression Model: 
I define the regression model by the following equation: 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑍𝑖𝑡  
The dependant variable is the non-financial corporations’ leverage ratio 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
, where 𝐷𝑖𝑡  
is the non financial corporations’ total debt, encompassing loans, debt securities and 
pension fund reserves and 𝐴𝑖𝑡  is representative for non-financial corporations’ total 
assets. On the right-hand-side of the equation, I include three vectors of independent 
variables. The first vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡  includes institutional factors encompassing two dummy 
variables of being inside the European Union and European Monetary Union, the 
efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law and the corporate tax rate. Moreover, a 
dummy variable relative to the crisis is also considered, to analyse how much the 
current recession has been affecting the non-financial corporations’ leverage. The 
second vector, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , encompasses macroeconomic variables, meaning all those ratios 
related to each country’s GDP, including GDP per capita, GDP Growth, GDP standard 
deviation and GDP standard deviation’s growth. Furthermore, industrial characteristics 
and ratios compared to each country’s GDP are also included in this second vector, thus 
all those indicators related to Households, to Non-Financial Corporations and to 
Monetary Financial Institutions. In the end, the vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡  includes a dummy variable 
for each European country in order to control for country-specific effects.  
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5- Regression Results Analysis: 
Table 2 shows the regression results. Model 1 represents the regression with only 
institutional factors as the independent variables. The R
2
 of the regression model is 
19,9%.  As it was expected, the EMU Entry is highly positively significant, with a p-
value of 0,8%, and a  of 0,38; However, there is no correlation found with the EU 
entry. This finding shows that starting in 1999, the European currency helped countries 
to increase their debt level. But entering the EU itself does not necessarily ensure the 
facility of access of debt funding. The efficiency of the judicial system variable, 
examined by La Porta (1999), is in line with the forecast and shows a positive 
correlation with the dependent variable at a 1% level of significance. Thus, the increase 
in the level of indebtedness is more favoured for those countries with efficiency and 
integrity of the legal environment. Different results, not aligned with expectations, are 
given by the second variable previously analysed by La Porta (1999): the rule of law. It 
presents a negative , with a low level of significance, differently from La Porta’s 
findings. The corporate tax rate shows a negative correlation with the leverage ratio, 
going against Modigliani and Miller (1963), and a low significance with the dependent 
variable. This could be explained, as Modigliani and Miller (1963) stated, by the fact 
that countries have already reached the level of debt that maximizes the value of the 
firms.  
Regression model 2 introduces the macroeconomic variables. As The R
2
 of the model 
now increases to 53,4%. As Table 2 shows, all the data related to the welfare of a nation 
are negatively linked to firm leverage. The most highly significant are the GDP per 
capita, with a  of -0,005, and the GDP Standard Deviation with a  of -650, 
respectively at 1% and 5% level of significance, meaning that the trend of borrowing 
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money in Europe is negatively correlated with the increasing production internal to each 
country. This can be reasonably explained, because a higher social welfare implies less 
necessity to borrow money. The other two variables linked to Countries’ GDP are not 
significant at all. Households’ investment rate and households’ saving rate are both 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable, and both show low levels of 
significance. Shifting the attention to non-financial corporations, their investment rate is 
positively related to the dependent variable with a  of 0,32, and it is significant at a 
10% level. The variable used to express profitability, the non-financial corporations’ 
profit share, is also positively correlated with the leverage. In fact, it has a  of 0,34, but 
it has a higher level of significance, expressed by a p-value of 0,1%. The profitability 
variable results to be a positively highly affecting factor for the leverage ratio, agreeing 
with Graham (2000) study, witnessing that more profitable countries borrow higher 
amounts of money, because they have the availability to do so, as to increase their 
investment opportunities. High investment rates are in fact positively related to 
leverage, as just mentioned, because they could potentially imply high potentials for the 
firms. Thus, firms engaging with larger investment projects have larger leverage ratio, 
as Antoniou et al. (2007) stated. Furthermore, as stated in the European Central Bank 
report (2007), the total debt over GDP ratio winds up being positively related to the 
leverage ratio, but from this study it is not significant. This could be due to the negative 
relation between the dependent variable and the macroeconomic ones, as previously 
examined.  Going through the last sector, I decided to analyse the banking sector 
represented by Monetary and Financial Institutions. It is possible to notice that the debit 
over GDP is positively related to the dependent variable, differently from the credit over 
the GDP. The debit is much more highly significant than the credit; in fact, it has a p-
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value of 0.2%, thus significant at a 1% level. The credit over GDP ratio is only 
significant at a 5% level. This means that the leverage ratio of non-financial 
corporations is highly affected by MFI loans granted by non-MFI euro area residents, 
including the general government and the private sector, and by non-MFI holdings of 
securities, such as shares, other equity and debt securities, issued by MFI in the euro 
area. 
Regression model 3 controls for country-fixed effects. It involves the introduction of a 
dummy variable for each country presented in the study, in order to control the 
individual countries’ impact on the choice of leverage. A country with a strong internal 
economy, namely Germany, is chosen to be the omitted country, thus to compare it to 
the results of other countries. There are some countries dropped out the regression due 
to missing values or collinearity with certain variables, thus they do not show up in 
Model 3
5
. The final R
2
 of the regression results is 71,2%. Interestingly, I find that the 
level of indebtedness from country to country does not differ from the German one. The 
only exception is represented by the French firms’ leverage, which winds up being, on 
average, 11% lower than that of the German firms. As Table 2 Model 3 shows, this 
relation results to be highly significant at a 1% level of confidence. A less relevant 
correlation is given by the U.K Non-Financial corporations’ leverage, which is on 
average 6.7% higher than German Non-Financial corporations’ one, but at a relatively 
low level of confidence, namely at 10%.  
 
 
 
                                                        
5
 Estonia, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary 
and Poland present constant values or have missing correlations. 
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6- Conclusions: 
In this paper, I propose to empirically verify what are the most relevant variables 
affecting leverage in firms across European countries. In order to do so, I explore the 
data contained in the European Central Bank’s database. My analysis is based on the 
OLS methodology, using the non-financial corporations’ leverage ratio as the dependent 
variable. Analysing the institutional factors affecting the dependant variable, I find the 
most relevant were the occurrence of the crisis, from 2008, and the entry into the 
European Monetary Union, which both led to an increase of the debt ratio; however, the 
EU entry does not appear to be associated with firms’ capital structures. These findings 
indicate that, while the membership of the EU does not necessarily help improving 
funding conditions of firms, joining the EMU does indeed facilitate firms’ access to 
debt funding.   
I document a high significance of the legal protection connected to a higher level of 
indebtedness, consistent with La Porta’s (1999) finding. The results found also show 
that the corporate tax rate is not a highly affecting variable for the leverage ratio, as 
Myers (1984) predicted, and it presents a negative correlation with the dependant 
variable as Stiglitz (1973), Heaton (2002) and Myers (2003), discussing in favour of the 
pecking-order theory, stating that frictions such as transaction costs, taxes, agency costs 
and managerial optimism lead to a financing hierarchy.  
In addition, I find an alignment of the results with the trade-off theory regarding the 
positive relation between the Investment rate and the profitability rate of Non-Financial 
corporations with the dependant variable. This is also inconsistent with Myers and 
Majluf (1984), who found the negative correlation between profitable firms and 
leverage. A relevant significance, matching what was found in the European Central 
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Bank (2007), is the negative correlation between the GDP per capita with the leverage, 
and the positive correlation of the bank loans to other countries with the dependent 
variable. In the final part of this study, no relevant correlation between countries was 
found, except between Germany and France. The French Non-Financial corporations 
turned out to be on average 11% less levered than German ones. Since the connection 
between the two sectors is highlighted by a relevantly high significance, it might be 
explained by a difference in the drivers leading to the capital structure formation.  
As Gaud et al. (2007) examined, capital structure choices, in a large number of 
European countries, do not adequately fit neither with the trade-off theory nor with the 
pecking order one. Macroeconomic conditions are relevant determinants of capital 
structure and leverage levels, but economic conditions affect both the availability of 
financing and the ability to raise capital. Therefore, economic events, such as the 
formation of a unique monetary union and a decrease in barriers to trade, or the 
occurrence of a recession, can lead to a more significant level of indebtedness, thus 
witnessing that economic conditions produce the most relevant impact. 
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Table 1: 
 
  Descriptive Statistics   
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Efficiency of Judicial System 168 5,5 10 8,5893 1,54166 
Rule of Law 168 4,17 10 8,71 1,65967 
Corporate Tax Rate 282 0 0,523 0,2668099 0,09007215 
Leverage Ratio 241 0,1507 1 0,346449 0,09531298 
Investment Rate Households 274 0,0195 0,2853 0,0958901 0,03613636 
Saving Rate Households 274 -0,0626 0,87 0,1002069 0,07079195 
Investment Rate NFC 274 0,0855 0,4163 0,2424131 0,06604285 
Profit Share NFC 274 0,2841 0,5884 0,4222682 0,07577168 
Debit/GDP 214 0,03307 5,23041 1,2300077 0,86421931 
Credit/GDP 214 0 0,43225 0,048736 0,08243284 
Debt/GDP 240 0,0005 3,5735 0,9254372 0,49002639 
GDP Growth Rate 288 -0,19085 0,31565 0,0572536 0,06790692 
GDP Standard Deviation 288 0,01844 0,22113 0,0921672 0,04284606 
GDP Per Capita 288 2,8545 80,79594 22,0922618 13,93953225 
GDP Growth Standard Deviation 288 0,00223 0,22299 0,040877 0,03761932 
Population 288 430,5 82520 19220,356 23564,59331 
Valid N (listwise) 126         
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Table 2: 
 
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
N. Observation 163  148   148   
R
2
   19,90%   53,40%   71,20%   
    Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient 
Constant  0,331   0,241 ** 0,454 ** 
EMU Entry  0,038 *** 0,013   0,147 *** 
Efficiency of Judicial System 0,014 *** 0,028 ***    
Rule of Law  -0,01 * -0,013   -0,005   
Corporate Tax Rate -0,125   -0,188   -0,287 * 
Crisis   0,044 *** 0,54 *** 0,046 *** 
Investment Rate Households     -0,219   -0,044   
Saving Rate Households     -0,145   -0,258   
Investment Rate NFC     0,322 * 0,219   
Profit Share NFC     0,34 *** -0,179   
Debit/GDP       0,047 *** 0,016   
Credit/GDP       -0,186 * -0,338 *** 
Debt/GDP       0,016   -0,039   
GDP Growth Rate     -0,091   -0,274 ** 
Real GDP ST.D     -0,65 ** -0,429   
GDP Per Capita     -0,005 *** 0,001   
GDP Growth ST.D.      -0,454   -0,337   
Belgium          0,026   
Greece           0,073 * 
Spain           -0,048   
France          -0,111 *** 
Italy          -0,019   
Netherlands          0,024   
Austria          -0,006   
Portugal          0,023   
Finland           -0,06   
Denmark          0,057   
Sweden          0,116   
U.K.           0,114 * 
        
Note: 
*** Signficant at 1% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
* Significant at 10% level       
 
